MARX
by Tom Milstein
2/7/1997
“On
the afternoon of the 14th of March at a quarter to three, the greatest living
thinker ceased to think.” So Friedrich Engels eulogized his friend and comrade
Karl Marx at his gravesite over a century ago. Another great thinker had died
the previous year, and Engels was moved to compare the two: “As Darwin discovered the law
of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in
human history .... His name will live through the centuries and so also will
his work.”
Engels' comparison of Marx to Darwin, and the analogy
he drew between their theories, has not stood the test of time. Darwin's theory remains
viable. Marx's does not.
And yet Marxism was not
defeated by some greater thinker or mightier theory. His system, never lacking
for opponents, worthy and otherwise, remains remarkably intact — as a theoretical
system. That is why he is so disturbing a presence in our time, in a way that Darwin, the more successful
of the two theorists, is not. Events, not ideas, have confounded Marx's theory.
His theory has been shattered by history, but never overthrown by any successor
theory of comparable scope and depth. The best that contemporary thought has
been able to generate by way of a theoretical refutation of Marx's system is
embodied in the passionate conviction that all universal theoretical systems
are inherently false. This view, virtually an article of faith in social science
now, is the true homage which the 20th century pays to Marx, the last of the
great system-builders. It testifies to the general resentment at having to
remain camped on the outskirts of Marx's deserted and ruined but strangely
uncircumventable city.
The French Revolution was
Marx's intellectual springboard. He regarded it as the decisive event of the
l9th century, a cataclysm which shaped all aspects of life in Europe.
He thought that if its secrets could be plumbed, the Revolution would become a
mighty paradigm for analyzing history, politics and society. In this sense all
of Marx's economic and historical investigations, as well as his arduous ascent
from speculative philosophy to social science, amount to an extended commentary
on his concept of the origins and consequences of the French Revolution.
The Russian Revolution is for
our time what the French Revolution was for Marx's. The critical evaluation of
Marx's theory of history, therefore, really depends on juxtaposing the theory
to the reality of the Russian Revolution. How well does the theory explain the
reality? The question is not academic. Nor is it unfair to Marx. The Russian
Revolution was in fact mastered by “professors” of theoretical and applied
Marxism who called themselves Bolsheviks.
If we focus the Marxian
searchlight on the Russian Revolution, two very dark shadows immediately stand
out: Why, given the pre-capitalist character of Russian society, did the revolution
assume a socialist, a post-capitalist, form? And why did this socialist
revolution produce a totalitarian society?
The socialist form assumed by
the Russian Revolution is problematical because Marx envisioned socialism
maturing out of the contradictions of capitalism at its ripest — that is, in
the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe — and not in a backward
country like Russia, where capitalism was just emerging. And the totalitarian
outcome of the Russian Revolution is truly mysterious, inasmuch as it
introduced a strange society into the world for which Marx made no provision
and whose impact on the 20th century was such as to defeat his entire
historical prognosis.
What the Russian Revolution gives us, then, is
a socialism where it ought not to have been, and a totalitarianism that ought
not to have been at all. Between these two conundrums Marxism cannot be
stretched. But where precisely is the theory's breaking point?
The Bolsheviks, who made the
Russian declaration of socialism, justified themselves in Marxian terms. Their
Menshevik opponents, who renounced all thought of a socialist revolution in Russia as
“adventurism,” were denounced by the Bolsheviks as cowardly renegades from
Marxism. Lenin and Trotsky argued that their socialist revolution confirmed
Marx because it corresponded to the new form of class struggle and revolution
in the new era of capitalist development — the era of Imperialism. Imperialism
transcended the limitations of the nation-state through the global reach of
financial capital. Russia
might be generally backward and pre-capitalist, but finance capitalism — unlike
its national counterpart — could still seed numerous pockets of industrial
development. The Bolsheviks regarded these pockets as advanced outposts of
European capitalism, and therefore altogether appropriate places for the
socialist world revolution to commence.
This argument obviously
stretches Marx's theory. Does it strain the theory past its breaking
point?
Lenin and Trotsky never claimed that their socialist revolution would
actually
produce “socialism in one country”; they predicted that it would spread
from Russia to the more advanced countries of Europe, whose great wealth
could then be tapped for the
purpose of modernizing the Russian economy. Such modernization would
stave off
the counterrevolutionary menace which lurked in Russia's overall
backwardness. They
never denied that if the revolution failed to spread, socialism in
Russia
would certainly be overthrown.
Marxism would need some
stretching if it was to survive its World War I debacle, when a paralyzed Socialist
International watched helplessly while its member parties endorsed the war aims
of their respective national governments, thus freeing the European working
class to slaughter itself in blithe disregard of the pieties of “proletarian
internationalism.” The rescue of Marxism demanded heroic measures. The
Bolsheviks offered not only daring theoretical innovations, but a vivid demonstration
of their practicability — a victorious revolution.
The alternative to granting
the Bolsheviks their Marxist credentials, notwithstanding their revisions, is
not some pristine form of Marxism, untainted by Bolshevism's subsequent crimes.
It is rather to acknowledge that Marxism collapsed when the guns of August
began to roar. So let Marxism be allowed new life in the Bolshevik revolution,
and the Bolsheviks their claim to the Marxian heritage, albeit in a creatively
extended form. The breaking point arrives soon enough.
The Bolsheviks saw the Russian
Revolution as a great drama in three acts. The first stage began in February
1917 when the Czar's “feudal” regime was overthrown by a democratic revolution
of the entire people and a “bourgeois-democratic” government installed. This
first, “capitalist,” phase ended in October when the Bolshevik party, utilizing
its power in the workers' and peasants' soviets, overthrew the “capitalist”
regime and inaugurated the second, “socialist,” stage. The third stage would
arrive when the Russian Revolution extended itself to Western
Europe and triggered the world revolution. It followed from this
scenario that if anything went wrong in the third act, if the revolution failed
to spread through Western Europe but was instead isolated and confined to Russia, the
socialist achievements of the second stage would be rolled back by a
counterrevolutionary alliance of reactionary forces from inside and outside of
the country. Its pockets of advanced capitalist industry notwithstanding,
Russian society overall was just too backward to sustain an insular socialism.
Only the political achievement of the first stage — bourgeois democracy and its
capitalist social order — would remain.
The fundamental assumption
underlying this scenario was that Russia
was a Western country whose “laws of development” would replicate the sequence
of historical stages into which Marx had organized the history of Europe. The Bolsheviks did not propose to annul or skip
over the capitalist stage in Russia's
development; they would merely drastically foreshorten or “telescope” it into
the eight months between February and October. If Bolshevism were overthrown, Russia would
return to this stage of development, which would then re-extend itself for the
full period of time necessary for capitalistic accumulation to modernize the
country. An unpleasant prospect for socialists, to be sure, but one which would
leave Russia no worse off than she was before the Bolshevik October — better
off, in fact, for the intervening socialist episode would at least sweep away
the deadweight of Russia's remaining feudal vestiges far more thoroughly than
the bourgeoisie would ever dare.
But of course Russia
was not a Western country. The terms “Oriental,” “Asiatic,” and “semi-Asiatic”
do crop up in Lenin and Trotsky's descriptions of Russia,
but they used these terms only to connote Russia's
extreme backwardness as compared to “the rest of Europe.”
For Marx, however, these terms were not merely descriptive. He used them very
carefully in a powerful category of social analysis, equal in weight to
“feudalism,” “capitalism,” and the other categories of his theory. The “Asiatic
mode of production” was for Marx the social system of “Oriental despotism,” the
predominant form of society in the non-Western world. The distinctive feature
of this social system was its overgrown (by Western standards) state bureaucracy,
which combined the functions of coercive domination and economic exploitation
of the population, functions which were sharply differentiated in Western
history. In the Orient, in other words, the government was also the ruling
class. Marx consistently defined Russia as an Oriental despotism,
“feudal” only in the social nomenclature which it borrowed from its European
neighbors.
Was Marx wrong to regard Russia
as a quasi-feudal Oriental despotism? Numerous upholders of Russia's
“fundamentally Western” heritage, Marxist and otherwise, have defined Czarist
Russia as a semi-Asiatic feudalism. Questions such as this have been known to
produce scholarly quarrels lasting centuries. Fortunately, the question has
long since been definitively answered — not speculatively, but
“experimentally,” i.e. by the actual outcome of the Russian Revolution.
There was no private ownership
of the means of production in the U.S.S.R. The revolution was isolated, and yet
no capitalist restoration occurred! This incontrovertible fact left open only
two possible interpretations. The absence of private ownership might truly
testify to the survival of socialism in Russia. In other words,
notwithstanding the failure of the revolution to spread into the advanced
industrial countries of Europe, no counterrevolution occurred in Russia. In this
case, Marx was dead wrong to insist that the prerequisite for socialism was an
advanced industrial economy. Of course, if he was wrong about this, he was
wrong about everything, for Marx did not postulate socialism's dependence on a
pre-established industrial base, he concluded it at the end of a tight chain of
reasoned analysis of history and society.
On the other hand, if a
counterrevolution did occur, then Russia cannot be a “fundamentally
Western” country, for the counterrevolution, in overthrowing Russian socialism,
manifestly did not restore capitalism. In this case, it is not Marx, but the
Bolsheviks, who were wrong about everything. Whichever of these two
interpretations is correct, the connection Marxism and Bolshevism is here
sundered, precisely by absence of any capitalist restoration after the
revolution was effectively quarantined from Europe.
Here is the point at which the Bolsheviks' “stretched” Marxism snaps — and
recoils back upon them with all the stunning fury of the Stalinist blood bath.
But which interpretation is
correct? Was Russia
still socialist, or did a counterrevolution occur? It would be illogical to
throw out Marxism in order to salvage the socialist reputation of the Soviet Union, in view of the fact that the Bolsheviks
based the legitimacy of their entire enterprise on Marxism. Apart from logic,
however, there is the overwhelming evidence of continuity between Marx's
definition of Russia as an
Oriental despotism and Stalin's transformation of Russia into a totalitarian autocracy.
If we begin our analysis of the Russian Revolution with Marx's definition of
the Czarist autocracy as an Oriental despotism, then the characterization of
Stalin's regime as “totalitarian” becomes not just a static descriptive
category but a genuine historical process with its roots deep in Russia's
institutional heritage. It is no longer necessary to derive Soviet totalitarianism
from such ahistorical sources as Lenin's organizational genius or Stalin's
wicked soul. The absent capitalist restoration becomes the invisible “Asiatic
restoration” — invisible to the Bolsheviks, who were expecting a resurgent
capitalism, against which they adopted measures that actually nurtured Russia's
recrudescent Oriental despotism. The nationalized economy, and the coercive ramparts
which the Bolsheviks threw up to protect it, were the very counterrevolution
incarnate. Socialism's “dictatorship of the proletariat” became Oriental
despotism's “overgrown state bureaucracy.”
Marx's definition of Russia
as an Oriental despotic rather than a European feudal society is the only
characterization which renders intelligible the totalitarian rather than
capitalist outcome of the Russian Revolution. Bolshevism's derivation of the
revolutionary process in Russia
from the history of Europe — from feudalism to
capitalism to socialism — was a Procrustean imposition. Eurocentrism blinded
the Bolsheviks to the real form of any authentic Russian counterrevolution: not
a restoration of capitalism, but the return of Russia's Oriental despotic
heritage, of the Asiatic pattern of monolithic state coercion and exploitation
of society by a bureaucratic class of powerholders. The Bolsheviks sowed
socialism in Oriental despotic soil — and reaped totalitarianism. The Bolshevik
October launched Russia's
movement from “the freest country in the world” (Lenin's description of Russia after
the February revolution) to the reign of “Ghengiz Khan with a telegraph”
(Bukharin's characterization of Stalin). The Bolsheviks were the real (if
unwitting) counterrevolutionaries of the Russian Revolution.
So Marx is vindicated! He
cannot be held responsible for Bolshevism's misappropriation of a theory whose
applicability he specifically restricted to Western Europe.
He cannot be held responsible for Bolshevism's willful disregard of his clear
definition of Russia as an
Oriental despotic rather than feudal society, his emphatic exclusion of Russia from
Western civilization. So he certainly cannot be held responsible for the
monstrous consequence of all this Bolshevik “revisionism” — Stalinist
totalitarianism.
Or can he? Set against all the
evidence that Marx, had he lived to see Bolshevism, would have disavowed it as
a gigantic falsification of his views on socialism and Russia — evidence which,
although inferential, since Marx is not alive to give it, is quite compelling —
is evidence of a different kind, tending to a different conclusion. It is a
fact that the Bolsheviks, no matter how misguidedly, were sincerely animated by
Marx's theory and vision. It is a fact that almost none of the Marxist
opponents of the Bolsheviks challenged their most fateful assumption — that Russia was
“fundamentally Western” (because they all shared it). It is a fact that the
Soviet regime invoked Marx for legitimacy. It is a fact that the political
vehicle in and through which totalitarianism entered the modern world was
Marxism.
There is no question here of
crude amalgamations of Marxism and totalitarianism. The mere fact that Marx's
concept of the Asiatic mode of production offers such powerful insights into
the origins of Russian totalitarianism absolves him from such tendentious
judgments. Marxism and totalitarianism are not the same thing; the question is
rather one of Marxism's vulnerability to totalitarian exploitation and manipulation.
This vulnerability has yet to be explained, or even faced, by those who would
invoke “true Marxism” against Communist realities. So prescient in other ways,
why did Marx not anticipate totalitarianism, the most potent phenomenon of the
20th century — especially when he analyzed so acutely its predecessor, Oriental
despotism? And since he loathed this Oriental despotism, viewing it has the
moral and historical antithesis of Western civilization, which he cherished,
how was it possible for his form of socialism to be hijacked by the
totalitarian movement of our time?
Let us retrace our steps. The
solution to the problem of the “missing counterrevolution” lies in Marx's
concept of the Asiatic mode of production. Marx explicitly placed Russia under
the rubric of this mode of production, whose outstanding trait was its unified
exercise of political domination and economic exploitation through the singular
institution of a state bureaucracy which “owned,'' de facto if not de jure, the
means of production. The personnel of the state were therefore the ruling
class. Stalinism, while in no sense the counterrevolution the Bolsheviks were
expecting, certainly does qualify as the counterrevolution they ought to have
expected: an “Asiatic” rather than a “bourgeois” counterrevolution.
But this explanation cuts two
ways: against Bolshevism, but also against Marx. If the real counterrevolution
was Bolshevism's inadvertent triggering of an Asiatic restoration, then after
that counterrevolution Russia
should have returned to some form of Oriental despotism. In that case, Stalin
should not have been able to command the industrial transformation of the country's
economy without fatally undermining his own regime. Russia should have remained an
agrarian country, for, from the Marxian standpoint, no counterrevolution can
carry through a revolutionary transformation of the means of production. Yet
that is just what Stalin did. Moreover, Marx held that the despotic aspect of
class power in Asiatic society was bound up with its agrarian mode of
production. The agrarian economy, resting on its base of inherently dispersed
and disorganized peasants, was the necessary social correlate of Oriental
despotism's highly organized and centralized state bureaucracy. But Marx identified
no corresponding social function in industrial society for a continuation, let
alone a gigantic augmentation, of state tyranny. Quite the contrary: according
to Marx, the main producers in industrial society, the workers, possess a
capacity for self-organization which militates against any such despotic
superimpositions. Yet the industrialization of Russia was accompanied by the
greatest intensification of despotism in history.
Finally, Stalin's
“industrialized Oriental despotism” shatters Marx's historical theory, according
to which Oriental despotism is not supposed to have a future, only a past. Marx
called this social formation a “mummy” which would disintegrate into dust when
exposed to the fresh air of Western imperialism — a disintegration he welcomed
as ridding the world of its most stagnant, oppressive and degrading social
system. He left unclear the matter of whether it was to be Western capitalism
or Western socialism which would lead the peoples of the non-Western world to
modernity. But he was very definite that their “Asiatic” heritage had no role
to play in this modernization (except to facilitate it by vanishing).
But if Stalinist
totalitarianism is a modernized form of Oriental despotism, Marx was wrong
about the stationary and vegetative character of Oriental despotism. The
totalitarian transformation of Russia
reveals latent powers of self-development in the Asiatic mode of production.
The result of these powers — totalitarianism — spoils Marx's entire historical
prognosis by introducing a third force into the dialectic of class struggle
between bourgeoisie and proletariat, into which Marx resolved world politics,
and from which he projected his socialist vision of the world's future.
A revolution sponsored by a
counterrevolution, an industrialized Oriental despotism, and a dynamic,
self-transforming Asiatic mode of production: perfect Marxian paradoxes. We
used Marx's ideas to appraise the Russian Revolution, thereby clearing
socialism of its Soviet identification and Marx of responsibility for
totalitarianism; we must therefore be prepared to accept the consequence of
using the Russian revolution to appraise the ideas of Marx: the spontaneous combustion
of Marxism.
Marxian theory, born of the
French Revolution, was slain by the Russian Revolution. But the paradoxes to
which the theory gives rise when confronted by the reality of the revolution carried
out in its name become manifest only in retrospect. Prior to the Russian
Revolution they were merely latent in Marxism. Of course it was this very
latency which made Marxism so ripe for totalitarian appropriation. Did not the
socialist movement absorb from Marx the euphoric assumption of the world's
irresistible Westernization? By consigning the non-Western world to past limbo
and future oblivion, Marx in effect announced the end of the East-West schism
in world history, in the form of total victory for the West and the
unconditional surrender of the East. It followed from this declaration of a
Westernized world that the inner contradictions of the West's social system,
capitalism, would become — had become — the governing laws of world politics.
From this perception of a bourgeoisified world Marx advanced to his confident
prophecy of the immanent necessity of socialist revolution, the former being
the guarantee of the latter. Capitalism had to become a universal system in
order for Das Kapital to become the
world's Bible. Marx's wish-fulfilling assumption made it possible for
totalitarianism to don its socialist disguise: if the world is capitalist, and
Stalinism is anti-capitalist, then Stalinism had to be... socialism. A warped
and distorted socialism perhaps, but still... socialism.
Paradoxes in theory which only
become manifest as a result of some subsequent event in the real world cannot
truly be said to lie in the theory itself. They lie at the intersection of the
theory with the world, and for that reason are not theoretical contradictions
per se, which must be intrinsic to the theory. But these theory-world paradoxes
do serve as pointers toward the theory's inherent contradictions. In other
words, beneath the paradoxes of Marxism which stand out so clearly in the
retrospect of the Russian Revolution, there must lie a deeper contradiction in
the theory itself, a contradiction which was there even before the Russian
Revolution had occurred. We are after what Marx might have called the
“ideological element in Marxism,” the contradiction in his thinking that
blinded him to what he could have known and should have known about the approach
of totalitarianism even before it arose.
These paradoxes which sprout
at the intersection of Marxian theory and the Russian Revolution — where then
do they point? Like all pointers, in two directions at once: toward the East,
which, obviously, Marx gravely misperceived; from Marx's ideology, which
generated his skewed view of the East. But to identify this ideology, which is
the true theoretical contradiction of his doctrine, we must work our way back
to it from a deeper consideration of his misperception of the East, reversing
the actual movement of Marx's thought, which proceeded from ideological preconception
to Eastern misperception.
To the limited extent that
Marx thought about the future of the East, he saw it as little more than modeling
clay to be molded by the West in its own image. His nonchalant colonialism
toward the non-Western world envisioned no real participation or contribution
on the part of the subject: the indigenous institutions, traditions and culture
of the East were destined to disappear completely. Marx never dreamed that the
clay might come alive, that it would react back upon its Western manipulator
with sufficient strength, not just to resist the modeling process, but to remodel
the West itself. Westernization and modernization were synonyms to Marx, and
conceived by him strictly as a one-way process. The West would replicate itself
in the East, and the East would disappear into thin air.
Marx profoundly misconceived
the future of the East-West relationship — so profoundly that he could not
envision it as a relationship at all, insofar as that term connotes interaction
where Marx saw only one-sided manipulation. It is an astonishing error, not
only because its visible refutation — the irruption of totalitarianism in our
century — has been so dramatic and so absolute, but because Marx committed it
with such smug assurance. But the reverberations of this error do not extend
only to Marx's posterity, which is to say, us. They echo back into Marx's past,
or rather, the past which he construed from his theory of world-history.
Marx assumed that there would
be no future relationship between East and West, that the East would simply
expire, because there had been no past relationship. He presented the flow of history as hermetically
Eurocentric, with the East world-historically inert. He never claimed that the
sequence of historical development he attributed to Europe
applied also to the East; this was to become the cardinal Stalinist falsification
of his theory. He simply held that only Europe had even known progressive
historical development in the true sense, whereas the East, locked within
static cage of its Oriental despotic social system, “vegetating in the teeth of
time,” remained stranded outside the historical process altogether. And since
history was a unique property of Europe, Europe alone was responsible for
history: Marx presented Europe's development
as continuous and self-contained, a movement driven solely by its own inner
class struggle dynamic through successive stages of economic organization, free
of all significant outside influences.
Marx arranged his theory of
history so as to demonstrate this self-sufficiency of European development. His
ostensible purpose was to banish all “non-material” factors from the scientific
explanation of history, in line with his famous dictum that “It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their
social being that determines their consciousness.” Marx's immediate purpose in
promulgating this dictum was, of course, to overturn Hegelian idealism. But on
a deeper level Marx regarded all idealist philosophy as essentially a continuation
of religion's supernatural explanation of history in secular disguise. And Marx
saw himself as a kind of diabolic-humanistic Prometheus who, by puncturing the
pretensions of religion, would liberate humanity with fire stolen from the
gods. His real interest in religion was iconoclastic. Beyond demonstrating to
his own satisfaction that religion was the most epiphenomenal of all human
phenomena, his interest in the subject was very limited.
Now it so happens that the
chief evidence for a powerful Oriental influence on Europe's
development lies in the sphere of religion — precisely where a historical materialist
would be most insensitive to it.
Why did the West adopt an
Eastern religion as its ideology, and remain under its sway for 1500 years? The
ideological triumph of Christianity in the West should have triggered loud
alarms in Marx's theoretical early warning system. Non-Marxian historians might
dismiss the Eastern provenance of Christianity as a mere historical accident,
or treat it as an example of the power of great ideas to “float free” of their
originating environment and take root in completely foreign soil. But
“idealist” explanations of this sort are impermissible to historical
materialists. According to the Marxian critique of ideology, the sway of any
given idea can only testify to the power of a corresponding social force. The
apparent power of the idea is the real power of the social force.
Pagan Europe
suffered from no shortage of its own indigenous ideologies, religious and
secular. What then could the triumph of Christianity over indigenous Western
paganism represent if not a massive Oriental intrusion into Western historical
development?
Marx never even considered
this problem — an omission which was no doubt conditioned in the first instance
by his overall disdain for religion, both as a phenomenon in its own right, and
as a field for fruitful scientific inquiry. But suppose Marx had posed the
question of the significance of Christianity's Oriental provenance. What could
he have possibly made of it? How could he have ever integrated the fact of
Christianity's Oriental origin into his theory? Historical materialism
constitutionally rejects the very possibility of Eastern influence on the West,
no matter how compelling the evidence for it or where that evidence might be
located. The theory describes history as the result of interaction between
different classes, not different societies. And this “class struggle” analysis
of history is binding for Marx: in order for the West to be defined as a
self-developing entity, each stage in its development must be shown to “grow
out of” the preceding stage exclusively. Classical slavery “grew out of”
primitive communism, feudalism “grew out of” classical slavery, capitalism
“grew out of” feudalism, just as socialism will “grow out of” capitalism. Each
new stage is determined by contradictions in the mode of production of the
previous stage; these contradictions manifest themselves in class conflict;
class struggle is therefore the motor force of history.
The entire series of
historical stages through which Marx depicts Western history as passing serves
therefore a double function, each one conditioning the other: Western history
is sufficient unto itself, independent of the rest of the world; and historical
materialism is established on a “scientific” foundation, since it explains this
history without the aid of any deus ex machina, either in the form of divine or
metaphysical intervention, or of external influences originating outside the
bounds of the social system whose transformations are being explained.
If Christianity testifies to
the impact of Oriental civilization on the West, for Marx such testimony could
only serve as additional vindication of his preconception that religion's role
in the determination of history was trivial. For if Western history is the
product of contradictions in its own modes of production, how could historical
changes introduced from without, from another mode of production geographically
removed from the West, not be trivial? Indeed, Marx often seems to betray an
unstated but deep-seated conviction that the real ideology of the West is
secular Greek philosophy and its European elaboration — almost as though
one-and-a-half millenniums of Christian religious hegemony were just an
un-Western aberration, perpetrated, no doubt, through some colossal fraud of
the priests. This peculiar bit of Voltairean gnosticism, of course, flies in
the face of reality: secular philosophy, until recently, has never been more
than the ideology of intellectuals, gaining mass influence only when absorbed
into the body of Christian religious doctrine.
Marx failed to appreciate the
fact of Eastern influence on the West's development for reasons that can only
be described as “ideological,” in precisely Marx's own sense of that term. The
defects in his theory of historical materialism — its ingrained bias against
evidence drawn from the field of religion, and its exclusive reliance on an
intra-societal dynamic, as opposed to intersocietal forces, to account for
historical change — are defects which implement this failure rather than explain
it. The premier role of Christianity in Western culture, and its plainly
Oriental origin, are not obscure clues to an esoteric mystery. They are obvious
material facts of Western history. It was not Marx's theory which prevented him
from seeing them, but Marx who prevented his theory from seeing them. Only an
ideology could have wielded such power over Marx, leading him to stare through
the centrality of Christianity in Western culture and thus elide the problem of
its Oriental origin. But what ideology? That is the mystery — the mystery of
Marx's ideology.
There exists one puissant clue
to the solution of this mystery. Marx's view of the past (historical
materialism) and his view of the future (socialism) run aground on the
phenomena of Christianity and Communism, respectively. And both Christianity
and Communism originated in the East. They are Oriental intrusions into Western
history. But to speak of Christianity and Communism as “Oriental intrusions” is
to refer only to their origins. Apart from their similar origins, is there
anything to connect the two phenomena? After all, if Marx's error truly is
ideological in nature, there ought to be more than this one correspondence.
There ought to be additional similarities between Christianity and Communism —
similarities which would point beyond their similar origin, to an actual
similarity of function.
We begin our search for
additional linkages between the two phenomena by examining that aspect of
Christianity which is specifically Oriental — the aspect which Christianity,
even as it became a “Western religion,” carried over from its Oriental origins
and which represents the East's real contribution to the development of the
West. Identifying the “Oriental content” in Christianity would provide us with
a “missing ingredient” in Western history suppressed by Marx's theory of
historical materialism — an ingredient which, in view of the magnitude of Christianity's
role in Western history, may be presumed to have been a major determinant of
that history. Furthermore, since Marx's theory did suppress this ingredient
from the West's past, it is reasonable to infer a connection between his
failure to recognize the function of this ingredient in the West's own history
and his failure to anticipate the rise of Communism. In other words: Marx
failed to see in the West's past what he failed to foresee in the world's
future.
What then is Christianity's
Oriental content? It is that which is Jewish in Christianity, for it was out of
Judaism that Christianity evolved, and it is in its Judaic component that
Christianity most acutely manifests its Oriental content.
Judaism is not just a religion
of the East, but in a real sense the paradigmatic religion of the East. It
amounts to a religious grasping of the organizational principle of Oriental
despotism, its theological conceptualization as it were. With their sublime
vision of the single, universal God, the Jews realized in their heads the very
thing that geopolitical realities kept robbing them of: the visionary consolidation
and perpetuation of their own Oriental despotic empire, surpassing in power, majesty,
and durability those worldly empires of the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates river
valleys by which they were constantly buffeted. But with this difference: God's
spiritual autocracy, his omniscience, omnipotence and eternality, worshipped
not in a private cult of the elite but as the common faith of an entire people,
signified the appropriation and internalization by that people of what hitherto
had been an exclusive property of the ruling elites of the Oriental despotisms
— the principle of a single center of authority, a center to which all thought
and action had to be related as so many means to one great End. Denied
attainment temporally, in an actual and durable state, the governing
institutional principle of Oriental despotism was transmuted by the Jews into
monotheistic religion rather than monolithic social organization, which is to
say, the guiding principle of the Universe rather than a concrete fact of
political life. The means/End calculus became a heuristic salvational device
for an entire people just because it was prevented from becoming the elite's
private administrative technique. Thus, in Judaism, where the universal
spiritual authority of God supersedes the worldly power of any ruler, His law replaces
the actual bureaucratic structure of the despotic state, and history becomes
His field of activity, His empire.
This inward ideological leap
turned the Jewish people into a “nation of priests” and made every Jew into a
functionary of God. The terrific psychic dualism which is built into Jewish
monotheism, rooted in the gulf between Creator and creation, gave powerful
religious sanction to an ascetic model of conduct, for behavior strictly
regulated by rational conformity to God's written law, rather than by the usual
mixture of terror, tradition and custom. This ascetic spirit of Judaism differs
sharply from the mystical, magical, or orgiastic spirit of the other religions
of the ancient world. It is based, in Max Weber's language, on world-rejection
rather than world-flight, and stems directly from monotheism's radical
devaluation of the world in favor of the transmundane God in whom alone value
subsists. God, unlike the gods, cannot be manipulated through appropriate
ritual observance and sacrifice as a means of controlling events in this world;
He alone is the great manipulator, and salvation for the Jewish people consists
in making themselves, as nearly as possible, His tool, a task requiring
vigilant self-policing according to the dictates of His law.
The West's Christian ideology
thus did not merely originate in the East, but in an Eastern religion which
peculiarly “captured” Oriental despotism by introjecting its functional
principle as a guide to conduct, a religious ethos, while projecting its
structural principle into the very fabric of Universal space and time. And
while Christianity adulterated Jewish monotheism with diverse pagan themes
-e.g., its incarnate man-god savior, its Trinitarian theology, and its
sacrament-dispensing priestly bureaucracy — it also retained important elements
of it, always upholding the spiritual primacy of asceticism, anticipating the
future redemption of the world, and affirming the fundamental oneness of God.
What did Christianity
contribute to the history of the West? According to Marx, very little, because
Christianity is a religion, and religion is epiphenomenal — i.e., having no power to determine the development
of a social system. But we have discovered that there are more things in the
Christian religion than were dreamt of in the philosophy of Karl Marx.
Christianity the religion was the conduit for an Oriental influence on the West
— an influence which Marx rendered his theory incapable of acknowledging. And
since Christianity was such a conduit, we are quite justified in attributing to
Christianity a shaping influence in Western history, so long as we appreciate
that the role we are assigning to Christianity is really the role of that which
is specifically Oriental in Christianity, which is to say, its Jewish
component, which embodied the influence of the social system of the East in the
West.
Christianity sustained
civilization in Europe after the destruction of the Roman
Empire. Without the advanced organizational and cultural principle
which Christianity represented, Europe would
have reacted to the collapse of Roman power by reverting to the Neolithic tribalism
which was indigenous to it. Christianity prevented such a reversion by allowing
a mode of production to emerge in Europe which was settled and agricultural,
without being Asiatic (i.e., the “feudal mode of production”); it preserved in
significant part the cultural level of the Roman Empire
without its stultifying state despotism. Post-Roman Europe did not abandon the
Oriental despotism of the Roman Empire, but
institutionalized it in the Roman Catholic Church, the material embodiment of
Oriental despotism's contribution to European history; and acculturated it in
an ideology based on the spiritual ideal of asceticism, of renunciation of the
world and self-renunciation. The two taken together — the Church's
hierarchical, centralized, rational-bureaucratic institutional structure, and
its ascetic ethos — became Europe's only
unifying force amid a welter of centrifugal tendencies and decentralized local
powers.
Christianity therefore made
European feudalism possible. Feudalism therefore cannot be considered the
second stage in a unilinear sequence of Western historical development running
from Hellenic to modern times, as Marx would have it. It must rather be seen as
a hybrid synthesis of Europe's indigenous Neolithic tribalism with the Roman Empire's Oriental despotism — a synthesis made
possible by the derivative monotheism of the Christian religion.
Now if the monotheist
component of Christianity constitutes its most distinctively “Oriental” element,
and if this Oriental element supplies the “missing ingredient” in Western
history which Marx's theory suppresses, then it follows that there was something
akin to monotheism, in content and function, in Communism — and that Marx
suppressed this “something” from his vision of the world's future, just as he
suppressed monotheism from his theory of its past. We already know what this
“something” is: totalitarianism.
Just as monotheism is a
“religious grasping” of the organizational principle of Oriental despotism,
totalitarianism is its “political grasping.” Thus Communism became a “secular
religion” of the East which used Oriental despotic methods — the terroristic
subjugation of all segments of society by a single coercive center — in order
to transform its rural, agrarian mode of production into an urban, industrial
economy. The quasi-religious character of this movement showed up in the
ascription by the people of traits to their rulers which are essentially divine
— traits of omniscience, benevolence, and terrible power. In the prototype of
Communist states, the U.S.S.R., these traits coalesced around a single
personality. During this period, the entire population, from the lowliest
sweepers of streets to the highest party officials, lived in intimate dread of
this one man. But no alien force fastened Stalin's rule onto the Soviet people;
they imposed it on themselves. The charisma of his terror, like all other forms
of charisma, was in the eyes of its beholders; the measure of his authority,
only the totality of their submission.
The totalitarian function of
the Communist movement in Russia
parallels the function of the monotheist component of Christianity in the West:
to mobilize the people against themselves. A squalid contradiction, when viewed
from the standpoint of a West which has outgrown its religious roots and can
therefore pretend that it never had any. Squalor there is, but also valorous
accomplishment: out of nothing, the Soviet people built themselves up into an
autonomous power in the world. They did it by transforming themselves from a
ruined peasant people into an industrial people. And they used the terroristic
methods of organized self-renunciation to do it: that scourge of the people,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
practiced its most horrific violence on itself.
The Russian people inflicted
Communist totalitarianism on themselves. They built it up from within, from what
they had to work with, from their Oriental despotic heritage — from what they
were. They refined the coercive side of Oriental despotism, its state
bureaucracy, into a mass totalitarian party, in order to transform the
traditional, agrarian-peasant side into modern industry. So out of the terror
came something besides terror: the capacity to survive in the modern world
through the power of self-control. It is the same dualism that inheres in all
asceticism, the same terror-inspired rationality that lies behind the West's
experience of monotheism. There is no rational connection between the arbitrary
terror of Stalinism and the modernization of the Soviet
Union. It is because the connection is religious ¾ i.e. totalitarian ¾ that it was effective, effective in the same way that
Calvin's predestinarian God stimulated Protestants, as a matter of
anxiety-reduction (although not of logic — the logical response would have been
fatalistic resignation), to unheard-of feats of rational economic enterprise.
All direct comparisons of
Western and Communist modernization fail because the totalitarian core of the
Communist modernization experience has no obvious correlate in Western history.
No obvious correlate, because Western historians are insensate to any but the
gross physical manifestations of modernization. They try to compare the
industrialization experiences of the two societies, oblivious to the fact that
the industrial revolution in the West was the culmination, not the beginning,
of its modernization. And because Western industrialization was not accompanied
by totalitarian developments in the political sphere — indeed, just the
opposite, for this was the period in Western history when laissez-faire and
representative democracy emerged as guiding political norms — they conclude
that there is no analog to totalitarianism in the modernization of the West.
From this conclusion emerges the picture of the modern world as torn between
two opposing “models” of modernization: the Western and the totalitarian.
But the modernization of the
West did not begin with the industrial revolution. It began with the Protestant
Reformation, a religious revolution which subjected Europe
to the most brutal dislocations and bloody upheavals. If we compare the
Communist modernization of the Soviet Union to
the real period of the West's modernization — the period commencing with the
Reformation and culminating in the industrial revolution — we discover some
truly interesting parallels. We find, for example, that the political dimension
of modernization in the West was far from the benign triumph of Enlightenment
it is usually depicted to be by Western historians whose grasp of the
modernization process is limited to the industrial revolution. Calvin's Geneva,
Munzer's millennialist communities, and the Massachusetts Bay Colony of Puritan
New England are but three instances of “modernizing” regimes whose totalitarian
intensity was inferior to the Communist example only in respect to the
technological means available to them.
An even more provocative
analogy is to be found in the realm of ideology. Earlier we noted that “The
Russian people inflicted Communist totalitarianism on themselves. They built it
up from within, from what they had to work with, from their Oriental despotic
heritage: from what they were. They refined the coercive side of Oriental
despotism, the state bureaucracy, into a mass totalitarian party, in order to
transform the traditional, agrarian-peasant side into modern industry.” Is this
not what the European peoples did to themselves during the Reformation, working
with similar materials, and yielding a similar result? Only instead of tapping
their political tradition, which was feudal rather than Asiatic, they drew on
their religious tradition, or rather its “despotic” monotheist kernel,
ruthlessly stripped of its original and acquired pagan accretions until nothing
was left but the empty ghost of a Savior and a terrifyingly real divine
Sovereign, as arbitrary, imperious and maddeningly opaque to human reason as
any modern totalitarian ruler. Nobody has stated the result more succinctly
than Max Weber:
...the significance of the
Reformation [lies] in the fact that now every Christian had to be a monk all
his life. The drain of asceticism from everyday worldly life had been stopped
by a dam, and those passionately spiritual natures which had formerly supplied
the highest type of monk were now forced to pursue their ascetic ideals within
mundane occupations....
Christian asceticism, at first
fleeing from the world into solitude, had already ruled the world which it had
renounced from the monastery and through the Church. But it had, on the whole,
left the naturally spontaneous character of daily life in the world untouched.
Now it strode into the market-place of life, slammed the door of the monastery
behind it, and undertook to penetrate just that daily routine of life with its
methodicalness, to fashion it into a life in the world, but neither of nor for
this world.
The ideology of Western
civilization was derived from the East, but moreover from an Eastern religion
which uniquely “captured” the active principle of the prevailing social system
of the East, Oriental despotism — supposedly the antithesis of Western
civilization!
The Russian Revolution was
inspired by Western ideas of democracy and socialism, by the Western dream of
Communism, yet it culminated in totalitarianism — again, supposedly the
antithesis of Western civilization!
The connection between these
two apparent paradoxes is a failed theory — the failed theory of Karl Marx. It
is this theory which turns facts into paradoxes, simply by interposing itself
between them, so that neither can be used to understand the other. Yet it is
only in conjunction with each other that these two facts cease to be
paradoxical.
Marx's theory operates like a
stationary telescope set between past and future. Viewed through one end, it
reduces the role of the East in the determination of Western history to the
infinitesimal. Viewed through the other, it magnifies the phenomenon of Soviet
totalitarianism to the proportions the alien supernatural. The theory is the
problem. It is not a theory at all — not a theory of historical materialism,
not even a theory of socialism. Marx's telescopic theory is an ideology which, by
turning Western history into History per se, turned socialism into totalitarianism.
Thus it was not Marx's commitment to socialism which “biased” his attempt at a
scientific theory of history; nor his materialistic philosophy of history which
“corrupted” his version of socialism. Both aspects of his system were warped ab
ovo by an underlying ideology which Marx was not even conscious of upholding —
the ideology of Westism.
Westism is the ideology of
Western civilization. Like all active ideologies, it is a living, growing
thing, and appears now in a much more elaborate form than it did in Marx's day.
Additionally, Marx was far from being its sole begetter or even its best
propagandist. Marx's socialist-historical materialist version of Westism,
however, had a tremendous impact on the modern expression of the ideology.
Marx's Westism consisted of
two interrelated components. The first was his belief in the autogenesis of Europe, the belief which blinded him to the roots of
Western civilization, which he exalted, in Oriental despotism, which he
abominated. By viewing the West as a self-developing entity, governed solely by
its own internal laws of class struggle, he allowed himself to ignore the plain
evidence of decisive Eastern influence at critical junctures in Europe's development. He constructed his whole theory of
historical materialism around this lacuna, requiring his intra-societal, class
struggle analysis to serve as an explanation of all history, including those
aspects clearly due to inter-societal influences.
But the more elaborate the
theory became, the more loudly did the gaps at its periphery testify to the
existence of the hole at its center. If Europe
developed autogenically, how, for example, did feudalism “grow out of”
classical slavery? More to the point, in what economic sense is the “feudal
mode of production” an advance over that of the Roman
Empire? Also, how on historical materialist grounds can capitalism
be shown to have originated in — that is, developed out of the contradictions
of — feudalism? Marx was more or less
silent on these questions. But he must have felt their burden, because he
compensated for the vacuum at the center of his theory by carrying his
exaltation of Europe and denigration of the East to metaphysical proportions,
treating history itself as a European characteristic, and writing the Orient
out of history altogether: “Indian society has no history at all, at least no
known history. What we call its history, is but the history of successive
invaders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and
unchanging society.”
Marx's Westism led him to
mystify the uniqueness of the West into a self-developing essence. By confining
the very category of history to the West, he in effect included the very thing
he ought to have explained — the unique development of Europe
— in the definition of his subject, thereby saving himself the trouble of
explaining it. To preserve the egotism of Europe,
Marx simply disregarded the fact that according to his own sociology of the
East, the Asiatic mode of production, unchanged in essence, had stood beside
the West throughout the lather's manifold development. Had they never
influenced one another? Never, asserts Marx: history is the result of
interactions between different classes within a society, but not interactions
between different societies.
There existed, however, one
fixture of European history which extended down to Marx's own time and which
was not so easy to conjure away. Unlike Christianity, this fixture could not be
theoretically dismissed, because it was not simply a religious “ideology.” This problem presented itself to Marx in the
shape of a people of flesh and blood, with a coherent religious “ideology” and
a continuous history antedating Europe's and so, unlike the problems of
feudalism's “progressiveness” and capitalism's origin, could not be dealt with
by means of strategic silence. The role played by this people and their
“ideology” in European history cannot be reconciled with Marx's theory. Indeed,
their stubborn survival as a people was an ongoing reproach to Europe's pretensions — and to Marx's.
Anti-Semitism thus had to
become the other main ingredient of the Westist ideology. The Jews, symbols and
bearers of monotheism, served as a constant reminder to the ideologues of
Westism that Europe's history was not
autogenic. Their mere existence spoiled Europe's
pedigree, at a time when European imperialism desperately needed a purebred
sense of self-assurance and manifest destiny to justify its pillage and
conquest of the ancient civilizations of the non-Western world. What noble
lineage, what legitimate right to rule the world, could Europe
claim as the mongrel offspring of Oriental despotism and nomadic tribalism —
the very types of society over which it now sought hegemony? The European
conquest of the non-Western world would become a matter of naked conquest,
devoid of any higher authorization.
The Jews bastardized European
history — and the ideologues of Westism responded by bastardizing the Jews.
Notwithstanding the brutal consequences of Christian anti-Semitism, Christianity
had never denied the historical importance of the Jews — indeed, how could it,
given Christianity's claim to represent the fulfillment of Jewish prophecy? — and
thus always acknowledged the Jewish people's right to exist, if only as a
pariah people testifying through their perpetual exile to the truth of the
gospels. But Westism detached the tradition of European anti-Semitism from its
religious context and moved it into the realm of secular ideology. The Jews
retained all of the negative traits imputed to them by Christianity, but lost
the right to exist which hitherto Christianity had grudgingly conceded. The
Jews remained a pariah people in the Westist mentality, but their pariah status
lost its raison d'être. Thus Westism, by celebrating the West as an autogenic
miracle, helped mightily to prepare European acceptance of “a world without
Jews,” by insisting on a history in which Jews had no positive part, a sociology
which defined them as exotic parasites, and a future in which they would
“disappear.” The Westist ideology carried the delegitimation of the Jews beyond
the bounds of Christian anti-Semitism, into a realm in which, eventually, final
solutions would devolve into a matter of civil hygiene.
But Marx had personal as well
as theoretical reasons for incorporating anti-Semitism into his Westist ideology.
Just as the Jews intruded into European history in a way most embarrassing for
the celebrants of Europe's self-origination
and self-development, they also made their discomfiting presence felt in Marx's
family tree, implicitly mocking his pretension to be the Prophet of Europe.
The seeming incongruity of
Marx's anti-Semitism, not to mention its morbid odor, has led many students of
Marx to the selbsthass thesis, according to which Marx's anti-Semitism is to be
understood primarily in terms of the psychology of the self-hating Jew. The
biographical facts of Marx's life, particularly those connected with his
father's less-than-wholehearted conversion to Christianity, tend to support
this thesis. The stresses of marginality to which European Jews were exposed in
the l9th century, stresses which were only partially relieved — in certain
ways, actually aggravated — by conversion to Christianity, are well known.
The self-hatred thesis has
been strenuously resisted by most socialists, despite overwhelming evidence
that more was involved in Marx's anti-Semitism than casual or typical prejudice.
It is difficult for Marxists to reconcile the image of their hero as a titan in
the modern struggle for human liberation, with the rather sordid evidence of a
neurotic twist in his character. The main form which this resistance has taken
has been to Bowdlerize Marx’s anti-Semitism, a tactic which has been so
effective that most people are not even aware of its existence (see the Appendix
to this article for a compilation of Marx's comments on Jews and their
religion). Of course, Bowdlerization does not solve the problem, it only
suppresses it. Unpleasant though it may be to contemplate, Marx loathed the
Jews, and the self-hatred thesis stands as the most reasonable explanation of
this major warp in his thinking, which it locates in an appropriately
irrational source: Marx's inner shame at being something other, and less, than
a real German.
The trouble with the
selbsthass thesis is that it has been made to serve as more than an explanation.
It has become a way of encysting the problem, as though Marx's anti-Semitism
were a characterological carbuncle, diseased in itself, but fortunately walled
off from the healthy surrounding tissues of his thought. No attention whatever
has been paid to the relationship, whether causal or symptomatic, between his
anti-Semitism and his theory. Certainly acceptance of the self-hatred
explanation does not warrant this reticence, for self-hatred deals with the
motivation for Marx's anti-Semitism, and does not even address the matter of
its implications for the rest of his thought.
To treat with Marx's
anti-Semitism solely on psychological grounds is to destroy its significance as
a clue, an outcropping of hitherto unsuspected strata of meaning. Marx's
anti-Semitism was his violent emotional and intellectual reaction to the
Judaism in his assimilated self and to the Oriental despotic roots of his
beloved Europe, symbolized by and embodied in
the Jewish people. Just as he mutilated
the history of Europe with his theory of historical materialism by disregarding
the plain evidence of decisive Eastern influence at critical moments in Europe's development, so he did violence to himself in
almost every remark he made on “the Jewish question.” His anti-Semitism was
part and parcel of his inability to acknowledge the West's debt to the East.
His theory of history and his anti-Semitism are intertwined. Together, they
constitute Marx's contribution to the ideology of Westism. By constructing a
world-view which excluded the Jews, Marx tried to exorcise a personal demon. By
adopting this world-view Europe sought to
exorcise its age-old demon, the Jews. Having thus been culturally extruded from
the now-healthy body of Europe, the demon
could at last be disposed of in the manner appropriate to demons. The attempt
to carry out this “final disposition” came very close to success, but it failed
— and its failure marked the failure of the first, European form of the Westist
ideology. In its place has come the modernized —“Americanized” — version of
Westism which prevails today.
Eurocentrism became obsolete
with the defeat of European imperialism. But the ideology of Westism did not
die; it rose to the challenge posed by a new world order and became modern
Westism. Modern Westism is Westism adapted to the new fact of 20th century
politics: the displacement of Europe by America as the hegemonic center of
the West.
The
original purpose of the myth of autogenesis in the ideology of Westism was to
radically delegitimate the East in order to justify Europe's
imperialist conquest of the world. Now the myth serves another purpose: to
provide the pseudo-historical background for the mystique of totalitarianism.
Just as the myth of the West's
autogenesis provides Westism with its historical rationale, the mystique of
totalitarianism supplies its political “theory.” The myth denies the Oriental
despotic component in Western history; the mystique converts that which has
been denied into the moral opposite of Western civilization — “modern
totalitarianism” — and invests this opposite with all of the fear and disgust
felt by the West toward its own repressed Oriental despotic past.
The mystique of
totalitarianism is built up by means of the method of reification. The
differences
between two societies — East and West — are presented as the essence of
one of
them. Any juxtaposing of Soviet and Western society yields dramatic
contrasts;
the mystical idea of totalitarianism reifies these contrasts, endowing
them
with a life of their own, a kind of élan vital of pure evil.
Totalitarianism
then becomes absolutely different from and absolutely unprecedented in
the
Western experience by definition. Actually, this image of Soviet society
fills
the place left vacant in Western culture by the disappearance of Satan.
The Soviet Union becomes the Manichean opposite of Western
civilization: utterly alien, exotic, and anti-human, reminding the West
of nothing
about itself and its past except its own comparative virtue.
The mystique defines
totalitarianism as an archetypal system of oppression based exclusively on
fear, ruling through a monolithic party-state apparat which infiltrates and
atomizes all real or potential centers of opposition to its power. Its sole
historical function is to aggrandize its own power so it is bereft of legitimacy,
a gangster state whose population has no influence on it, is helpless against
it, and exists only to be victimized by it.
The reason this totalitarian
archetype is mystical is because it forces a descriptive concept to serve in
place of a real theory. In the absence of a theory of totalitarianism, the
abstraction “totalitarian system” must be brought to life, reified into an
active subject. The resulting intellectual apparition supplants the real people
who constitute totalitarianism — the real people who preceded it, engendered
it, nourish it, and survive it, but who are reduced by the mystique to the role
of passive objects, “innocent victims” of the totalitarian machine.
Masquerading as compassion, the mystique paints what is in fact a sentimental
and condescending picture of the people who comprise totalitarian systems. The
crushing weight of oppression is always being lowered onto them from above, or
foisted onto them from without. The mystique never allows them to take
responsibility for it. The people are not held accountable for their government.
Now if the people over whom
the totalitarian regime reigns are not responsible for that regime, who is?
Answers are numerous, but most of them fall into two broad categories, one of
which might be termed the intellectual-academic and the other the
conspiratorial. The former category includes all those explanations which
invoke impersonal forces in whose steely grip humanity supposedly writhes.
Thus, to the question “Who is responsible?” the intellectual-academic
explanation answers “No one,” and goes on to place responsibility on
abstractions: “social forces,” “historical trends,” “the weight of a despotic
tradition,” and the like.
The problem with these
abstractions is not necessarily that they are wrong, but that they are, after
all, abstractions. They have no existence apart from the living people whose
behavior they help us to understand. They are not absolutions from
responsibility for totalitarianism, but measurements of that responsibility. As
Marx insisted on more than one occasion, the fact that man does not make
history “according to circumstances of his own choosing” must not be twisted
into the belief that someone or something other than man makes history. “Social
forces,” “historical trends,” and the like are not powers over a people but
traits of a people. When we delineate these forces and trends, using the tools
of social science, we are not describing a meta-human realm that is somehow
more real than the merely human, we are simply describing the characteristic
features of a specific people — in the case in point, the Russian people.
As against the
intellectual-academic explanation's sidestepping of the question of responsibility
for totalitarianism, and partially arising out of frustration with its
obscurantism, there is the conspiratorial explanation. Conspiratorial accounts
assign responsibility to every conceivable human agency but the responsible
one. They do not seek refuge in the abstract realm of impersonal “forces,” but
in the Christian-populist myth of a good-hearted and trusting people who are
forever being swindled, manipulated, or betrayed into totalitarianism by the
hidden hand of a shadowy elite. This elite is never of the people — i.e., the
German general staff, or the financiers of Wall Street — even though it may be
among them — i.e., the Jews. The one consistent theme of all conspiratorial
explanations, and the feature which it shares with the intellectual-academic
explanations, is that totalitarianism never arises because the people want it,
support it, and make it work. It always comes about against their will.
But no abstract social force
or “hidden hand” imposed totalitarianism on the Russian people. They imposed it
on themselves. This self-oppression is infinitely mysterious to the ideologues
of Westism because they can find no analogy to it in their own mythologized
version of the history of the West. The analogy is there, in the West's
monotheist religious heritage, but it tells the West more than it wishes to
know. To recognize it would be to acknowledge Europe as a peninsula of Asia in more than just the geographical sense, isolated
from but also connected to the Orient in just the right degree. To recognize it
would be to recognize in the totalitarian phenomenon the very process of
“Westernization” to which the West is presumably committed. Above all, to
recognize this analogy would legitimate Judaism as the -creative source of the
social formula by means of which the delicate balance between fear and
rationality was grasped in theory and realized in practice — in other words, as
the seminal source of Western civilization. But Westism will never extend
legitimacy to Judaism, for Westism, in the final analysis, is anti-Semitism.
Western uniqueness and Soviet
totalitarianism are real. They are not figments of the West's vain imagination.
But Marx's conceptual telescope turns these realities into something both more
and less than reality: into a myth of Western autogenesis and a mystique of
totalitarianism which together amount to the doctrinalized egotism of the West;
into the ideology of Westism; into the prologue to another world war and
another genocide.
APPENDIX
Marx On the Jews and Judaism
Let us not look for the secret
of the Jew in his religion, but let us look for the secret of religion in the actual
Jew.
What is the secular basis of
Judaism? Commercialism.
What is the worldly cult of
the Jew? Haggling. What is his worldly god? Money.
Very well! Emancipation from
haggling and money, and thus from practical and real Judaism, would be the
self-emancipation of our age.
An organization of society
which would abolish the preconditions of commercialism would render the Jew
impossible. His religious consciousness would dissolve like stale smoke in the
actual life-giving air of society....
Thus we perceive in Judaism a
general contemporary antisocial element, which has been carried to its present
apex by a historical development to which the Jews have zealously contributed —
an apex at which it must necessarily dissolve itself.
The emancipation of the Jews,
in the final analysis, is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism.
.... The Jew has emancipated
himself in a Jewish way not only by acquiring financial power but also because,
with and without him, money has become a world power, and the practical Jewish
spirit has become the practical spirit of Christian nations. The Jews have
emancipated themselves insofar as the Christians have become Jews.
Yes, the materialistic
domination of Judaism over the Christian world in North
America has achieved such clear and common expression that the
very preaching of the Gospel, the Christian ministry, has become an article of
commerce...
Out of its own entrails, civil
society constantly produces the Jew. What, actually, was the foundation, in and
of itself, of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism.
Hence the Jew's monotheism is
in reality the polytheism of many needs, a polytheism that makes even the
toilet an object of divine law.... Money is the universal, self-sufficient
value of all things. Hence it has robbed the whole world, the human world as
well as nature, of its proper worth. Money is the alienated essence of man's
labor and life, and this alien essence dominates him as he worships it. The god
of practical need and self-interest is Money.
Money is the jealous god of Israel before whom no other god may exist....
The god of the Jews has been
secularized and has become the god of the world. The bill of exchange is the
actual god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange.
The view of nature achieved
under the rule of private property and money is an actual contempt for and
practical degradation of nature, which, to be sure, does exist in the Jewish
religion but only in imagination.
What is contained abstractly
in the Jewish religion ¾ contempt for theory, for art, for history, for man as an end in
himself — is the actual conscious standpoint and virtue of the money-man. The
species relation itself, the relation between man and woman, etc., becomes an
object of commerce! The woman is haggled away.
The chimerical nationality of
the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the money-man in general.
Christianity overcame Judaism
only in appearance. It was too noble, too spiritual, to eliminate the crudeness
of practical need except by elevating it into the heavens.
Christianity is the sublime
thought of Judaism, and Judaism is the common practical application of Christianity;
but this application could become universal only after Christianity as the
completed religion had theoretically completed the alienation of man from
himself and from nature.
Only then could Judaism attain
universal dominion and convert divested man and divested nature into alienable
and saleable objects subservient to egoistic need, dependent on haggling.
The Christian salvation-egoism
in its practical fulfillment necessarily becomes the materialistic egoism of
the Jew, heavenly need is converted into worldly need, subjectivism into selfishness....
-- Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, 1844
.... Thus we find every tyrant
backed by a Jew, as is every pope by a Jesuit. In truth, the cravings of oppressors
would be hopeless, and the practicability of war out of the question, if there
were not an army of Jesuits to smother thought and a handful of Jews to ransack
pockets.
... the real work is done by
the Jews, and can only be done by them, as they monopolize the machinery of the
loanmongering mysteries by concentrating their energies upon the barter trade
in securities, and the changing of money and negotiating of bills in a great
measure arising therefrom. Take Amsterdam, for
instance, a city harboring many of the worst descendants of the Jews whom
Ferdinand and Isabella drove out of Spain,
and who, after lingering awhile in Portugal,
were driven thence also, and eventually found a safe place of retreat in Holland. In Amsterdam alone they number
not less than 35,000, many of whom are engaged in this gambling and jobbing of
securities.... The smartest highwayman in the Abruzzi is not better posted up about the
locale of the hard cash in a traveler's valise or pocket than those Jews about
any loose capital in the hands of a trader.
... the big Jewish houses,
such as that of Hollander and Lehren... are of the Portuguese sect of Jews, and
practice a great ostensible devotion to the religion of their race. Lehren,
like the great London Jew, Sir Moses Montefiore, has made many sacrifices for
those that still linger in Jerusalem.
His office, near the Amstel, in Amsterdam,
is one of the most picturesque imaginable. Crowds of these Jewish agents
assemble there every day, together with numerous Jewish theologians, and around
its doors are congregated all sorts and manners of Armenian, Jerusalem, Barbaresque, and Polish beggars,
in long robes and Oriental turbans. The language spoken smells strongly of Babel, and the perfume
which otherwise pervades the place is by no means of a choice kind.
.... Thus do these loans,
which are a curse to the people, a ruin to the holders, and a danger to the
governments, become a blessing to the houses of the children of Judah.
This Jew organization of loanmongers is as dangerous to the people as the
aristocratic organization of landowners....
.... Meantime the Czar will
get his fifty millions and... if he wants five fifties more, the Jews will dig
them up. Let us not be thought too severe upon these loanmongering gentry. The
fact that 1855 years ago Christ drove the Jewish moneychangers out of the
temple, and that the moneychangers of our age enlisted on the side of tyranny
happen again chiefly to be Jews, is perhaps no more than a historical
coincidence. The loanmongering Jews of Europe do only on a larger and more
obnoxious scale what many others do on one smaller and less significant. But it
is only because the Jews are so strong that it is timely and expedient to
expose and stigmatize their organization.
-- Karl Marx, “The Russian Loan,” New-York Daily
Tribune, January 4, 1856
.... But of what use is it for
Levy to attack Mr. Disraeli... so long as Mother Nature has inscribed, with the
wildest black letters, his family tree in the middle of his face? The nose of
the mysterious stranger of Slawkenbergius (see Tristam Shandy), who fetched
himself the finest nose from the promontory of noses, was merely a week's talk
in Strasbourg, whereas Levy's nose constitutes a year's talk in the City of London....
-- Karl Marx, Herr Vogt, 1860
After the two Bambergers,
father and son, procrastinated from week to week — first from month to month —
with promises to discount a promissory note for me, and after I went to that
Jew den with an appointment for that purpose, bringing with me stamped paper,
the young one informed me that the old one, who was also present, could not,
etc., etc.
That I did not box the ears of
these two Jews for this infamous procrastination, waste of time, and placing me
in a false position, was most regrettable....
-- Karl Marx, letter to Engels, July 31, 1851
.... The Jewish nigger
Lasalle, who fortunately departs at the end of this week, has luckily again
lost 5000 Taler in a fraudulent speculation. The fellow would rather throw his
money into the muck than lend it to a “friend,” even if the interest and
capital were guaranteed. In addition he acts on the notion that he must live
like a Jewish baron or baronized (probably by the Countess) Jew....
It is now completely clear to
me that he, as is shown by his cranial structure and curly hair — descends from
Negroes who joined Moses' exodus-out of Egypt (assuming that his mother or grandmother
on his father's side did not interbreed with a nigger). Now this union of
Judaism and Germanism with a basic negroid substance must produce a peculiar
product. The impertinence of the fellow is also niggerlike....
-- Karl Marx, letter to Engels, July 30, 1862